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POLITICS AND THE EFFECT ON THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD’S ADJUDICATIVE AND RULEMAKING
PROCESSES
William B. Gould IV∗
ABSTRACT
The National Labor Relations Act has never explicitly required political
balance in the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board)
appointment process. But the Eisenhower administration demonstrated that
policy shifts could be initiated through changes in NLRB composition. The
Kennedy Board shifted gears again, prompting critics to say that the Board
was on a “seesaw.” More pronounced polarization began to emerge in the
1980s as political party divisiveness and union decline created more
adversarial relationships.
In the 1990s, divided government produced a “batching” of appointees (in
contrast to annual Senate confirmation votes on each appointment as their
term expired), horse trading of “interchangeable elites engaged in an insider’s
game” as Professor Calvin McKenzie said. Ultimately, the consequences of
impasse through this process twice resulted in Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Act and the Constitution so as to alter the relationship between
the President and the Senate. But the Senate, under Senator Reid, was to trump
the practical effect of these holdings by eliminating the filibuster, which
frequently stalled or stopped NLRB appointments. Paradoxically, however,
through both oversight hearings and the Congressional Review Act of 1996,
legislative interference with the work of the NLRB has never been more
extensive.

∗ Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford Law School; Chairman of the National
Labor Relations Board (1994–1998); Chairman of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board (2014–).
The author wishes to thank Jaryn Fields, Stanford Law School ‘15, for invaluable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
This past year, the Supreme Court held that President Obama’s
appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) were
unconstitutional when made under the Recess Clause of the Constitution.1 The
Court held that the Senate’s three-day recess in question was “too short a time
to bring a recess within the scope of the Clause.”2 A 5–4 majority of the Court3
held that, while recess appointments can be made in both intersession and
intrasession recesses of the Congress, historical practice dictated that the
duration must be more substantial than what was involved in President
Obama’s appointments.4 The decision mirrored not simply increased political
polarization in Washington, particularly during the last few decades,5 but also
an impasse on labor policy, the culmination of which was a successful
constitutional challenge to the President.
Only Senator Harry Reid’s leadership initiative in producing the near total
repeal of the Senate filibuster as it relates to appointments,6 which had stalled
and stopped NLRB appointments, minimized its impact. Thus, notwithstanding
the 2014 constitutional diminution of the President’s authority to shape the
Board through recess appointments, where the advice and consent of the
Senate could not be obtained, the new Senate Rules adopted in 2013 appear to
have increasingly shifted congressional attention away from the appointment
process toward NLRB interpretation and administration of the law itself.
***

1

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
Id. at 2557.
3 Justice Breyer wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan. Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas and
Alito. Id. at 2550.
4 Id. at 2578.
5 See Joe Klein, The Town That Ate Itself, NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 1998, at 79. The first visible
manifestation of the labor impasse before the Supreme Court was New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S.
674 (2010), where the Court characterized the Board’s actions, when it constituted fewer than three members,
as without a statutory quorum, invalidating all decisions from 2007–2009.
6 Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-offilibuster.html.
2
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“The time of life is short” states William Shakespeare.7 Eighty years,
though constituting a generous lifespan for most individuals on the planet
Earth at this particular time, pails in significance compared with, for instance,
the 800 years that have passed since the Magna Carta was first propounded.8
Yet eighty is considerable, doubling the existence of the California
Agricultural Labor Relations Act, which, in major respects, is predicated upon
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).9 And, the NLRA contains a
framework that, whatever its considerable imperfections,10 has proved more
enduring than any of the major industrialized competitors such as Great
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
This eightieth anniversary of the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 is more politically challenging than the previous NLRA
anniversaries of say, for instance, middle age of forty, fifty, or even sixty that
were celebrated earlier.11 The age of eighty is traditionally associated with
creakiness, some measure of lethargy, and reflective anticipation of ones
reckoning or legacy, but in order for this law to withstand the political
environment that has truly surrounded it from the beginning of the Act in the
late 1930s,12 the age of eighty will have to become the new fifty. The pounding
7 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act 5, sc. 2. I have referenced
this portion of Shakespeare in William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and
Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609 (2006).
8 See MAGNA CARTA (David Carpenter trans., 2015); Jill Lepore, The Rule of History: Magna Carta, the
Bill of Rights, and the Hold of Time, NEW YORKER, Apr. 20, 2015, at 83, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/20/the-rule-of-history. Prior to the NLRA, Samuel Gompers
stated that the Clayton Antitrust Act constituted “sledge-hammer blows to the wrongs and injustice so long
inflicted upon the workers,” and that this declaration “is the Industrial Magna Carta upon which the working
people will rear their structure of industrial freedom.” Samuel Gompers, The Charter of Industrial Freedom:
Labor Provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Law, 21 AM. FEDERATIONIST 957, 971–72 (1914).
9 See Herman M. Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975—La Esperanza de California para
el Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 783 (1975).
10 See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE LAW (1993).
11 Judge Abner Mikva wrote about the role of both the judicial and legislative branches at an earlier
anniversary. See Abner J. Mikva, Concluding Comment, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the
American Labor Movement, 38 STAN L. REV. 1123 (1986). I have discussed this issue as well. See William B.
Gould IV, The NLRB at Age 70: Some Reflections on the Clinton Board and the Bush II Aftermath,
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 309 (2005); William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the
National Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REV. 937
(1986); cf. William B. Gould IV, Op-Ed., Crippling the Right to Organize, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A25,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/opinion/crippling-the-right-to-organize.html [hereinafter
Gould, Crippling]; William B. Gould IV, Op-Ed., Mistaken Opposition to the N.L.R.B., N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1985, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/20/opinion/mistaken-opposition-to-the-nlrb.html.
12 See 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1974).
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and scrutiny visited upon the Board and the Act during the past two decades in
particular are proof positive of that necessity.
The idea of the NLRA and the NLRB was born out of judicial repression, a
series of decisions employing a variety of legal techniques against trade
unions.13 It was thought that judicial predilections about economics and
politics were responsible for the continued constitutional invalidation of
federal and state statues affecting the labor market,14 until a landmark holding
produced a “switch in time that saved nine” and moved the United States away
from these approaches.15
All of this heralded a commitment to a better rule of law, an extension or
modification of the philosophy contained in the Norris La Guardia Act of 1932
that promoted both freedom of association and the collective bargaining
process, the means constituting a hands off, or laissez-faire or collective
laissez-faire,16 approach to labor disputes, through which the judiciary were
now kept out almost altogether.17 The Act and its creation of the Board
translated into interventionism in promoting the right to organize,18 though not
necessarily of collective bargaining itself—a framework designed to be an
effective substitute for law,19 through a mechanism designed as an effective
substitute for courts of general jurisdiction utilizing a new specialized expert
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
(1991); ELIAS LIEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE THE BAR (1950); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the
American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1116 (1989).
14 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 13; see also WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(5th ed. 2013).
15 For an overview of the developments of the Board’s subsequent activity, see HARRY A. MILLIS &
EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
AND LABOR RELATIONS (1950). The phrase “a switch in time that saved nine” is generally attributed to the
Supreme Court’s holding in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). However, the same
“switch” produced the outcome in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 to be constitutional).
16 O. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law, in LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE 20TH CENTURY 215 (Morris
Ginsberg ed., 1959). Kahn-Freund defined “collective laissez-faire” as follows: “It so happens that in [Great
Britain] (but not by any means in other capitalist countries as well) this principle of, if you like, ‘collective
laissez faire,’ came to be a preponderant characteristic of labour law in the course of the first half of our
century. . . . Seen from the lawyer’s point of view, its main characteristic today is its aversion to legislative
intervention, its disinclination to rely on legal sanctions, its almost passionate belief in the autonomy of
industrial forces.” Id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
17 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
18 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
19 See, e.g., Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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tribunal.20 Inherent in this approach was the idea of independence propounded
in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, where
the Court held that the President had no authority to remove appointees who
had fixed terms prior to the expiration of their terms and were therefore
regarded as independent, impartial, and free from the political process.21 This
prompted the writers of the Senate Labor Committee’s report on NLRB
legislation to remove the language of the statute referring to the Board as an
“independent agency in the executive department.”22
Yet, from the beginning it could not be as simple as that. The NLRB, like
the other Roosevelt alphabet agencies, was a quasi-judicial agency providing
for Board Members (or in the case of the other agencies, commissioners). The
concept of the General Counsel as an independent prosecutor to bring cases
before the policymaking Board was to come later much through the 1947
Taft-Hartley Act.23
The Board members were given limited and staggered terms of
appointment, as opposed to the life tenure possessed by the judiciary.
Philosophically embedded in this idea was the ability of the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to influence decisions of the Board through
the appointment process, an objective that can also be accomplished through
judicial appointments, especially at the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate
arbiter. But the big practical difference between the two different appointment
processes is that each new President may produce a relatively expeditious
change through administrative appointments—a difference which has led to the
characterization of the Board as on a “seesaw.”24

20 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959) (“Congress has entrusted
administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own
procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience . . . .”).
21 295 U.S. 602 (1935); cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding previously that the
President has exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate); James C. Miller, III, A Reflection on the Independence of
Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 297, 297–98 (“Independent agencies should not be independent. . . . Of
course, when agencies—independent or otherwise—engage in adjudicatory functions, I believe that strict
independence must be maintained.”). But policy may be initiated through adjudication as well as rulemaking,
and the line between the two is frequently thin. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969);
cf. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
22 WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB—A MEMOIR 122–23
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2012).
24 See Bernard D. Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 78 (1962).
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As I develop further below, the NLRB’s appointment process is a not an
inconsiderable feature of the changes that have produced substantially more
intersection (and frequently tension) between the political process and the role
of the Board. In the early years of the NLRA,25 little attention was given to the
shifts in balance between labor and management representatives because,
except for the appointment of one management labor lawyer, individuals did
not appear to be chosen as representatives of labor and management.26 In
addition, labor and management did not receive any kind of formal, let alone
statutory, representation on the Board.27 Notwithstanding the emergence of the
so-called “do nothing” 80th Congress that enacted the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments over President Truman’s veto, for the most part, Roosevelt–
Truman hegemony translated into a variety of appointments—but none overtly
associated with political affiliation as in recent years. For example, FDR’s first
two Chairmen were academics,28 but this was a precedent not returned to until
my appointment by President Clinton in 1993—and not renewed since then.
Since the beginning, the Act has never required any kind of balance
between Democrats and Republicans—a statutory absence that contrasts with
other regulatory legislation. However, for some period of time, balance has
been dictated by tradition. Professor James Gross has written that the “tradition
did begin with the Eisenhower Administration although even then it’s not so
clear that there was any compelling need to have 3–2.”29 Professor Gross notes
that this “tradition” has emerged “essentially unthinkingly . . . over the years”
and that, when the Board was expanded from three members to five as it was
after the Taft-Hartley amendments, President Truman deliberately appointed
one so-called liberal Senator (then to become Member) Murdock and one
“management person.”30 But even then there was no conscious decision to
reach a 3–2 balance, states Professor Gross, and he does not find any records

25 See J. Warren Madden, The Origin and Early History of the National Labor Relations Board, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 234 (1960).
26 Gerard Reilly, a management labor lawyer representative, was appointed by President Roosevelt in
1941. See Board Members Since 1935, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935
(last visited May 9, 2015).
27 This contrasts with the similar statutory scheme enacted in Japan at the time of the post-World War II
MacArthur Occupation. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, JAPAN’S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1984).
28 See JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937–1947 (1981).
29 E-mail from James A. Gross, Professor, Cornell Univ., to author (Jan. 7, 2015, 1:16 PM PST) (on file
with author and the Emory Law Journal).
30 Id.
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or discussion of this particular policy or when it was adopted, “let alone any
decision concerning the matter.”31
I. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
The Eisenhower administration witnessed the first major changes in the
policy direction of the Board and in labor-management relations generally.32
President Eisenhower appointed Martin Durkin as Secretary of Labor. Durkin,
previously a craft-trade union leader, only served nine months, but his
appointment prompted the characterization of the cabinet as “nine millionaires
and a plumber.”33 That administration expressed some interest in providing
further amendments to the Taft-Hartley amendments and changes in labor
policy, but, in truth, new appointments to the NLRB provided the greatest
opportunity to produce a new policy. The Eisenhower administration, in its
first year in Washington, 1953, realized this opportunity through three
vacancies that quickly appeared, two of which were filled fairly
expeditiously.34
President Eisenhower’s first chairman of the Board was management labor
lawyer Guy Farmer. The result of the Farmer appointment, and the
appointments to follow, was a policy shift reflected in a number of doctrinal
holdings involving, for instance, captive audiences and circumstances under
which unions could reply to the employer’s noncoercive antiunion
message35—the Truman Board held that a union had a right to reply, at least
under some circumstances.36 The Eisenhower Board favored expansive
protections of employer free speech rights, a new free speech proviso recently
incorporated in the Taft-Hartley amendments, and it was most reticent in
setting aside representation elections on the grounds that “the requisite
laboratory conditions” were not met.37 Similarly, the Eisenhower Board

31

Id.
See Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93 (1954);
W. Willard Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board: Herein of “Employer Persuasion,” 49 NW. U. L.
REV. 594 (1954).
33 Chapter 5: Eisenhower Administration, 1953–1961, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/
aboutdol/history/dolchp05.htm (last viewed May 9, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 See JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–
1994, at 94–95 (1995).
35 See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
36 See Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 615 (1951); see also Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NRLB, 197 F.2d
640 (2d Cir. 1952), denying enforcement of 96 N.L.R.B. 608.
37 See Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
32
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repudiated earlier Roosevelt–Truman NLRB decisions, which held that
interrogation of employees during a union organizational campaign was per se
coercive,38 the new decision holding that the question of coercion depended
upon consideration of a variety circumstances.39
The Eisenhower administration came to Washington with a belief that there
was too much centralized government in the nation’s capital at the expense of
local government. At the Board, Chairman Farmer expressed his view that
more of its authority should be ceded to state agencies.40 Ultimately, this was
to create a constitutionally mandated “no-man’s land,” which invalidated state
legislation under the preemption doctrine.41 As the Board ceded jurisdiction,
this led ultimately to an accommodation through which Congress froze the
Board’s jurisdictional yardsticks as part of the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act
amendments42—an approach that expanded federal jurisdiction and, some
contended, exacerbated Board backlog problems.43
Other Eisenhower Board decisions reflected a labor-policy shift in areas
involving secondary activity by unions, lockouts, and refusals to bargain, as
well as including the scope of bargaining.44 With the so-called Aiello doctrine,
the Board required unions to choose whether they would seek representation
through the ballot or on the basis of signed authorization cards through unfair
labor practice litigation.45
II. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
Almost as soon as the Kennedy Board came in the door in early 1961—
with the appointments and confirmation of Chairman Frank McCulloch and
Member Gerald Brown46—a third Democrat, John Fanning, initially appointed
by President Eisenhower, became part of the majority.47 Two others were to
38

See Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1379 (1949).
See Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 594 (1954).
40 GROSS, supra note 34, at 96.
41 Guss v. Utah Lab. Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1957).
42 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012)).
43 See ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1987).
44 GROSS, supra note 34, at 112–20.
45 Aiello, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954). The Kennedy Board subsequently reversed this decision in Bernel
Foam Products Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
46 Member Brown was the Regional Director in San Francisco and later served under Governor Brown in
his first administrations as Chairman of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board.
47 See GROSS, supra note 34, at 151.
39
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join this group, including Howard Jenkins, Jr., a Kennedy appointee in 1963
who ultimately became one of the longest serving members next to Member
Fanning. A fifth, former journalist Sam Zagoria, constituted the Board through
both the Kennedy and Johnson years. In the first period of much discussion
about the decline of labor law and the labor movement,48 a number of policy
issues confronted the new Board.
Thus, the election of President Kennedy in 1960 produced another shift,
one that explicitly brought to prominence anew the “seesaw” comment on a
whole host of issues, arguably just as contentious as the earlier Eisenhower
decisions in the wake of Taft-Hartley. One issue involved appropriate unit
determination in the context of the circumstances under which craftsmen, such
as pipefitters, electricians, plumbers, and iron workers, could sever from a
broader bargaining unit that included semiskilled and unskilled workers, as
well as craftsmen—the so-called craft severance issue. The Kennedy Board,
striking an intermediate position between its Roosevelt–Truman predecessors
on one hand and the Eisenhower appointees on the other,49 evoked a wide
variety of considerations in determining whether severance would be granted.50
This legal issue reflected the fight between the craft and industrial unions
involving this line of authority, and it was a chapter in the struggle between
some American Federation of Labor (AFL) craft unions, which have been
more sympathetic to the Taft-Hartley amendments and sometimes to the
Republican Party as well, and the industrial unions affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) that tended to be the one of the bedrocks of
the Democratic-Party coalition.
Second, the scope of the unit was addressed in a number of contexts where
unions or collective bargaining were absent. The NLRB decisions in this space,
however, reflected what the Supreme Court said about the resolution of unit
issues: “[V]irtually every Board decision concerning an appropriate unit—e.g.,

48 See SOLOMON BARKIN, THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT: AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
(1961); PAUL JACOBS, THE STATE OF THE UNIONS (1963); A.H. Raskin, The Big Squeeze on Labor Unions,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1978, at 41; A.H. Raskin, The Squeeze on the Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
1961, at 55. Some of these problems were also addressed in CLARK KERR ET AL., INDEP. STUDY GRP., THE
PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1961). These and related issues were subsequently discussed
in GOULD, supra note 10, and Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Workers of the World Divide: The Decline of
Labor and the Future of the Middle Class, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2012, at 88.
49 See, e.g., Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954); Am. Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252
(1939).
50 See Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966).
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the proper size of the unit—favors one side of the other.”51 In a series of
revisions involving the shape of an appropriate unit where collective
bargaining had not been established at all, the Board created a rebuttable
presumption that, where the dispute related to whether the unit would be at one
facility as opposed to a multilocation unit, it would be presumed that the unit
would be found appropriate at the single location.52 The important point made
by the Kennedy Board in these cases was that an appropriate unit could exist at
more than one location and that, notwithstanding the fact that a multilocation
might be appropriate, a presumption could be found at the single location
where the unit petitioned for by the union was there.53 This was so, reasoned
the Board, inasmuch as this result would favor collective bargaining because
granting a multilocation unit would deny workers an election altogether,
inasmuch as the union only had a requisite “showing of interest,” i.e. 30%
support for an election in the unit on a single facility basis, and under most
circumstances, a multilocation finding would result in a dismissal of the
petition altogether because of the inadequacy of the showing of interest.
Another important related issue is the circumstances under which picketing
could be regarded as prohibited conduct under the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act.
These amendments provided for injunctions against organizational picketing
engaged in beyond a reasonable period of time without a demand for an
election.54 The Kennedy Board held that picketing for the objective of
obtaining area-wage standards was not deemed to be organizational and thus
could not be enjoined because it involved a protest against working conditions
and was not an attempt to circumvent the secret ballot box provisions of the
Act.55 Similarly, the Kennedy Board addressed cases involving the issue of the
duty to bargain to the point of impasse or over unilateral decisions to contract
out work, holding that parties were obliged to bargain over such subject

51

NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 498 (1985).
See F.W. Woolworth Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1968); Frisch’s Big Boy III-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B.
551 (1964), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629
(1962); Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962). For actions subsequent to the Kennedy Board, see
Bowie Hall Trucking Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 41 (1988); Wyandotte Savs. Bank, 245 N.L.R.B. 943 (1979). Under
some circumstances this presumption may be rebutted. See Prince Telecom, 347 N.L.R.B. 789 (2006).
53 See NLRB v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965) (holding that the extent of organization may
still be taken into account along with other factors, notwithstanding the Taft-Hartley amendments). In this
case, the Supreme Court noted that the Taft-Hartley amendments precluded a unit based upon the union’s
petition as “controlling.” But the fact that the Board was establishing a presumption that could be rebutted
meant that this factor was not controlling.
54 29 U.S.C § 158(b)(7) (2012).
55 Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 321, 324 (1962).
52
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matter.56 The Supreme Court eventually resolved this issue, placing its
imprimatur upon the Board’s holding, if not the entire rationale employed by
it.57
To sum up the McCulloch Board, Professor Gross, again, has stated as
follows:
[It] facilitated unionization in several important ways. It intensified
regulation of employer representation election campaign speech and
other actions, including the resurrection and use of the Herzog
Board’s General Shoe doctrine. It increased the use of bargaining
orders based on authorization cards rather than representation
elections. . . . Other Board decisions loosening restrictions on union
secondary boycott activity and limiting an employer’s statutory right
to lockout had the potential of increasing union bargaining power.58

III. THE NIXON, FORD, AND CARTER YEARS
The Nixon and Ford years saw not just the occasional appointment of a
management lawyer as during the Roosevelt–Truman and Eisenhower
administrations but now a very substantial number of them.59 Most
prominently amongst these appointments was Chairman Edward Miller, whose
confirmation Senate hearing was the last one until my October 1, 1993 hearing.
The Nixon Board produced some measure of doctrinal change in the
mid-1970s,60 and then President Ford, upon succeeding Nixon subsequent to
his resignation, appointed Chairman Betty Murphy, another management labor
lawyer and the first female Chairman of the Board.61
By the late 1970s during the Carter Administration, the beginnings of
genuine political polarization began to appear on a scale unknown at the time
of Eisenhower. This development occurred simultaneously with a more
56

Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962).
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in
the case stressed management prerogative considerations involved in these matters, see id. at 225–26 (Stewart,
J., concurring), a theme that was to emerge anew in the Court’s subsequent decision in First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. See 452 U.S. 666 (1981); infra text accompanying note 70.
58 See GROSS, supra note 34, at 189–90. The bargaining order stance of the Board was ultimately
approved by the Warren Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
59 Besides Chairman Miller, others included Peter Walther. In addition, management labor lawyer Peter
Nash was named General Counsel.
60 See GROSS, supra note 34, at 217–41.
61 Chairman Murphy insisted on being called Chairman, given that that was the word that the NLRA
provided, unlike many who have wanted the title of Chair or Chairwoman.
57
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profound rightward drift of the Republican Party than had existed during the
Eisenhower–Nixon years, one which ultimately saw the demise of Republican
moderates in the coastal states like New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
California. The consequences of this polarization in the political process
inevitably affected labor-management relations and the work of the Board. In
the late 1970s, two of President Carter’s nominees—William Lubbers for
General Counsel and career bureaucrat John Truesdale as a Board member—
were the objects of an attack by Senator Orrin Hatch. Lubbers, it was
contended, attended a meeting or meetings with union officials relating to the
1977 Labor Relations Bill that provided the first serious effort for labor law
reform. Lubbers was confirmed, but not before a cloture petition filled in early
1980 broke a Republican filibuster. Hatch’s attack on Truesdale appeared to be
even more ideologically rooted and that nomination languished.
IV. THE REAGAN ERA DEALS FROM A NEW DECK
The divide between the parties on the Act and the Board intensified during
the Reagan era. President Reagan’s first nominee as Chairman of the NLRB
was John Van de Water, who had been a management consultant and was
opposed by organized labor. The Senate Labor Committee rejected his
nomination, and though eventually serving on a recess basis, he could not get a
favorable recommendation from the Senate.62
President Reagan then nominated in his place Donald L. Dotson, who was
confirmed by a voice vote on February 17, 1983, having a relatively easy route
to confirmation. Under Dotson, the ground was to shift in a number of
respects,63 perhaps more profoundly than would have been the case had Van de
Water obtained Senate confirmation.
Chairman Dotson became a lightning rod for organized labor. First, the
Reagan Board altered the course of case law in a number of important respects.

62 “In response to questions by Senator Edward Kennedy, he admitted that companies had hired him
during union organizing campaigns to keep unions out.” GOULD, supra note 22, at 20.
63 See Terry M. Moe, Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB, in 2 STUDIES
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ANNUAL 236, 272 (1987) (“Reagan imposed on the NLRB a
brand of radical antiunionism that business leaders did not demand and, in fact, had long resisted. But,
especially in an environment of economic adversity and union decline, some business leaders began to realize
over time that the reality of an antiunion NLRB was not to be feared at all—that it proved quite consistent with
their own, more confrontational approaches to unions. They were, in effect, dragged kicking and screaming
into the brave new world of political antiunionism by presidential leadership, and some saw that what was
clearly impossible in earlier decades was now quite possible indeed.”).
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Notwithstanding judicial precedent to the contrary,64 it foreclosed union
recognition on the basis of authorization cards when massive unfair labor
practices made it impossible for the union to accumulate the necessary cards to
establish a majority.65 In the wake of Supreme Court precedent holding unions
had the authority to impose disciplinary fines against full members,66 the
Reagan Board established the right to refrain under the Taft-Hartley
amendments meant the right to resign from union membership so as to escape
union discipline.67 The Supreme Court approved of this approach, with the
deciding vote predicated upon deference to the Board’s specialized expertise.68
In a number of landmark holdings during this period, the Supreme Court
narrowly interpreted the definition of “employee” under the Act so as to limit
the number workers who could exercise statutory rights: in one case, it
substantially excluded university professors.69 Perhaps even more important,
the Court held that a management decision to shut down its operation, or
partially shut down, was not subject to the duty to bargain obligation about
terms and conditions of employment, alluding to the fact that the principles of
“partnership,”70 so prominently associated with codetermination in Germany
and in the Scandinavian countries, had no applicability to the United States.
Meanwhile, the most vexatious problem of the 1980s involved the Board’s
procedural handling of cases—or more precisely, its failure to handle the cases
at all. Under the statute—which is deeply intertwined with the maxim that
“justice delayed is justice denied”—the greatest administrative backlog of
cases began to emerge and with it, of course, a considerable delay in its wake
in resolving cases from beginning to end. This translated itself into the first
boycott of the Board by organized labor (another was to come in the early
2000s in the second Bush administration), with then AFL-CIO leader Lane
Kirkland opining that perhaps it was best for the parties to resolve their

64 See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass’n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980); see also William B.
Gould, Recent Developments Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Board and the Circuit Courts,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497 (1981) (discussing United Dairy Farmers); Jay R. Bloom, Comment, United Dairy
Famers Cooperative Association: NLRB Bargaining Orders in the Absence of a Clear Showing of a Pro-Union
Majority, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 840 (1980).
65 Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984).
66 See NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213 (1972); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967).
67 Machinists Local 1327, 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982).
68 Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 117 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
69 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
70 First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674–78 (1981).
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differences “mano-a-mano” rather than through the administrative process or
rule of law.
As the Reagan era drew down, it became clear that Chairman Dotson was
not to be reappointed. In his place came Chairman Jim Stephens, a
congressional staffer with Senator Hatch, appointed by the first President
Bush, who had promised a “kinder gentler administration.”71 The new Board
attempted to pull back from some of the excesses of the Reagan predecessor
with a more balanced approach. But the big issue confronting this Board,
involving union politics and law, was just emerging in the form of the Supreme
Court’s 1988 decision in Communications Workers of America v. Beck, which
held that, under the NLRA, unions had a duty of fair representation obligation
not to expend union-security-agreement-obtained-dues payments non-germane
to collective bargaining.72 The Court also held that limited or financial core
members who were dissidents could object to payments sought and made.73
This was the “third rail” of labor law adjudication, which Republican
appointees in particular, dared not approach.
A whole host of issues emerged in the wake of Beck, not the least of which
related to issues regarding which union dues were to be defined as germane or
non-germane through collective bargaining itself. Inasmuch as not one single
one of them had been decided for six years after Beck, all of them were waiting
for the new Clinton Board to resolve subsequent to the President’s appointment
of me as Chairman of the Board in 1993. This was the situation at the time that
I took office in the spring of 1994, subsequent to the Senate’s confirmation
vote.74
V. THE CLINTON BOARD
The so-called Gingrich Revolution, which brought the Republicans to
power in both houses in Congress and cast the House of Representatives with a
particularly rightward slant, brought increased scrutiny of the Board to a level
exceeded only by the late 1930s and the Dies committee.75 But beyond initial
urgings by Republicans to the Board to produce decisions, there were

71

William B. Gould IV, Bush: More Tolerance with Labor?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 17, 1989, at B13.
See 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
73 See id.; see also Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (establishing procedures for
Beck litigation).
74 GOULD, supra note 22, at 33–50.
75 GROSS, supra note 12.
72
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relatively few criticisms or scrutiny of the actual implementation of the Beck
decision itself.76 However, there were questions constantly put to us by
Congress from 1995 onward as to when we would produce the decisions that
languished for half-a-dozen years. Ultimately, production began to dip
considerably.77
The Clinton Board initiatives attracted the attention of the Congress and
produced oversight through both oversight committees, as well as the
appropriations process.78 Some of the more stressful and contentious conflicts
emerged in connection with interrogation about the Board’s decisions and
expression of displeasure with them.79 Indeed, so paralytic was congressional
scrutiny upon Board members, one case, involving whether teaching assistants
were employees within the meaning of the Act, could not be released until the
Board saw the page proofs of my writing that expressed displeasure with
NLRB somnolence80 subsequent to my departure.
The most profound change emerged through the increased use of
Section 10(j) of the Act, under which the Board is authorized to seek
discretionary injunctive relief prior to the completion of the administrative
process.81 One particular company, Overnite, which was headed by the first
President Bush’s Secretary of Commerce, against which injunctive relief was
sought, produced criticism from Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania82 to
Republican Conference Chair John Boehner (today considered a
middle-of-the-road Republican in his capacity of the Speaker of the House),
who complained that the Board was attempting to “greatly handcuff” the
company “in continuing to effectively communicate with their employees.”83

76 GOULD, supra note 22, at 272–74. Of course, the Republicans were dissatisfied with the Beck decision
as well. See id. (noting the commentary of California governor Pete Wilson and Republican members of
Congress).
77 William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of
Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 478 tbls.1 &
2 (2007).
78 See GOULD, supra note 22, at 179–81.
79 Id. 154–75, 178–82.
80 I made this point earlier. See William B. Gould IV, The Labor Board’s Ever Deepening Somnolence:
Some Reflections of a Former Chairman, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1505 (1999); see also GOULD, supra note 22,
at 285 (“[T]here were other cases I very much wanted to push out. They involved the employee status of
graduate students working as teaching assistants at universities and residents, interns, and fellows on the house
staffs of hospitals.”).
81 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2012).
82 GOULD, supra note 22, at 164–65.
83 Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Congressman Bonilla said of our use of Section 10(j), generally: “It appears to
some of us that the Board’s activities toward Overnite are unjust.”84
No legislation emerged here, though the number of requests we received
from the General Counsel to authorize injunctive relief diminished
appreciably. “During my Chairmanship, we authorized 83 and 104 cases to go
to federal district court in the first two years, respectively. The number
declined to 53 in 1996 and 1997 and 45 in 1998 as the General Counsel
requested fewer authorizations in the teeth of congressional hostility.”85 With
the same objective of expediting the process, the Board devised bench
decisions for administrative law judges—“decisions issued from the bench or
within seventy-two hours from the close of the hearing.”86 Again, these were
designed for a purpose—to expedite cases.
When the Board took a first pass at expediting the election machinery
through rulemaking regarding the circumstances under which the presumption
in favor a single location unit would be deemed appropriate,87 congressional
Republicans, speaking on behalf of the National Restaurant Association, saw
this rule as a vehicle for workers to vote for unionization. Congresswoman
Northrup of Kentucky questioned me about this aggressively.88 Moreover, the
Wall Street Journal ran an article attacking the rule and suggested that readers
should get my telephone number and contact me about it.89 At a hearing
conducted by then-Congressman (later Senator) James Talent of Missouri, he
said, “You’re saying . . . there have been flip-flops in the past. In the name of
stability, under your rule from now on, it’s only going to be flop. . . . There
won’t be any flips.”90 The result here was a congressional appropriations rider
that precluded the Board from expending funds on any rulemaking of this

84

Id. at 179.
Gould, supra note 77, at 481.
86 Id.; see also NLRB v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1999) (permitting an
administrative law judge to make an oral bench decision without affording the parties the opportunity to
submit written briefs did not violate the NLRA); Lamont Stallworth, Arup Varma & John T. Delaney, The
NLRB’s Unfair Labor Practice Settlement Program: An Empirical Analysis of Participant Satisfaction, DISP.
RESOL. J., Nov. 2004–Jan. 2005, at 22.
87 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
88 GOULD, supra note 22, at 232.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 170 (alterations in original) (quoting Barbara Yuill, NLRB: House Small Business Subcommittee
Grills NLRB’s Gould on Proposed Rule, DAILY LABOR REP., Mar. 8, 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
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type—though the Board had been criticized in the past for failing to explore
this avenue.91
Finally, beyond Overnite itself, the Clinton Board drew attention for its
willingness to obtain injunctive relief against other employers, including
Caterpillar92 and the Detroit newspapers, which were in a bitter strike during
my Board’s term of office.93 Sometimes, in the context of then-Senator
Ashcroft’s rather critical questioning of a decided case, other members of the
Senate like Senator Edward Kennedy stated that the Committee should at least
notify Board witnesses about an intent to question them on particular cases.94
This issue had been raised at least a half-century ago by Senator Wayne
Morris.95 The interrogation and scrutiny reached what appeared to have been
unparalleled heights during the Clinton Era. Many believed that business was
“winning its war with the NLRB.”96 The Board took a battering of
congressional inquiry—in amounts virtually unprecedented since the 1930s
and 1950s. From 1994–1997, not one single appointment could be made to the
Board, other than through the recess route—a practice that would today be
condemned by the Supreme Court. At the conclusion of the Clinton Board’s
tenure, Aaron Bernstein noted that the number of injunction requests to the
Board had declined appreciably in 1996, 1997, and 1998 and claimed that the
Board had “blinked and bowed to the political pressure” of Republicans.97 He
concluded that my own proposals for labor law reform had gone “largely . . . .
unheeded. After years of grousing about that tiny agency with the huge
influence, Corporate America finally seems to have the NLRB in check.”98
Whatever one’s view, the Clinton Board99 paid a price for its commitment to
procedures that would fulfill the promise of the Act.
91 See Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative
Procedures Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the
National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); cf. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606
(1991).
92 GOULD, supra note 22, at 260–61.
93 Id. at 242–44.
94 Id. at 155.
95 Id. at 155–56.
96 Aaron Bernstein, How Business Is Winning Its War with the NLRB, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1997, at
59 [hereinafter Bernstein, How Business Is Winning]; see also Aaron Bernstein, The Long Knives Are Out for
Bill Gould’s NLRB, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1995, at 61.
97 Bernstein, How Business Is Winning, supra note 96.
98 Id.
99 The Board’s adjudicatory record—though modest in doctrinal shifts compared with what has been
described above—also influenced the Republican Congress’s response and, in some instances, retaliation. See,
e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec., 325 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1148–49 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, concurring) (holding that
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VI. THE SECOND BUSH BOARD
The Bush administration that followed in 2001 received little, if no,
attention regarding its failure to utilize the injunction machinery contained in
Section 10(j) or the period of time that the agency took to cope with unfair
labor practices.100 But an outcry against a series of decisions that reversed prior
authority, tilting substantially towards management, which came to be known
as the September Massacre,101 produced an appointment stalemate discussed
below.
Democrats, in control of the Senate after the 2006 elections, refused to
confirm any NLRB nominees, and thus the policy of “batching,” now a little
more than a decade old, ceased. As a result, all appointments came to an end.
President Bush, who was advised that he could keep the Board afloat on the
basis of recess appointees, as had President Clinton,102 refused to make
appointments, and the Board declined below three members—traditionally
regarded as a requisite quorum to issue a decision. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court held that the Board could not function at any point where there were
fewer than three members, even though a three-member Board had delegated
authority to function to the remaining members.103

postal ballots are appropriate in some circumstances); Kalin Constr. Co., 321 N.L.R.B. 649 (1996) (holding
that because last minute campaign speeches, electioneering, changes in the paycheck process have an
unsettling impact on employees and disturb the laboratory conditions which are a prerequisite for a fair
election, a change in the paycheck, paycheck distribution, the location or method of the paycheck distribution
would be a basis for setting the election aside); 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. 624 (1996) (holding that
a union’s litigation on behalf of organizing employees was not a “benefit” which interfered with the conduct of
the election); Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council No. 51, 321 N.L.R.B. 158 (1996) (holding that the
anti-dual-shop clause sought by the union had a primary objective and thus did not violate the secondary
prohibitions in the Act); McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1996), enforced, 131 F.3d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer could not unilaterally implement merit pay proposals even when
bargaining had taken place to the point of impasse); Mgmt. Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1995)
(holding that private employers, whether government contractors or not, are within its jurisdiction).
100 From FY 2001 to FY 2008, the NLRB authorized an average of 21 injunctions per year under
Section 10(j) of the Act. Litigation – Injunction, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphsdata/litigations/litigation-injunction (last visited May 9, 2015). Since then, the Board has averaged 43
injunctions per year. Id. For comparison, from FY 1994 to FY 2001, the Board authorized an average of 58
injunctions per year. Id.
101 GOULD, supra note 14, at 246–47.
102 Cf. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding President Bush’s recess
appointment of Judge William Pryor to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit).
103 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010).
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VII. ENTER THE OBAMA BOARD: MORE CONFLICT BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE BOARD
The first line of dispute between the Obama White House and the Senate in
2009104 arose out of the conflict regarding the appointment of Craig Becker, a
union lawyer, to whom Senator John McCain objected vociferously. Though
serving for two years as a recess appointee, Becker’s appointment was not
confirmed by the Senate. However, this period stands in contrast to the Clinton
Board in the 1990s and was one when Democrats controlled both chambers of
Congress, and, as a result, at least until the end of 2011, the Obama Board was
able to function reasonably free from legislative interference.105 The Clinton
Board experienced exactly the opposite, given the uninterrupted control of both
houses by Republicans from 1995 onward.
When Republicans took the House in the 2010 elections, matters began to
heat up. Since then, the House has convened approximately twenty times to
discuss the activities of the Board, most of them involving hearings before the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce.106 In the summer of 2011,
the full House Committee convened to debate proposed NLRB rulemaking to
expedite election procedures.107 Subsequently, legislation was introduced,
promoted by Congressman Kline, to remedy what the House characterized as
the “ambush election rule.”108 This bill assured, for the first time, that there
would be delays in the election process, in that the bill assured that the Board
would not be able to hold an election in less than thirty days.109

104 See William B. Gould, IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme: Is the Employee Free
Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1 (2009); William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of
2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations
Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291 (2008).
105 See Gould, Crippling, supra note 11.
106 See Expanding Joint Employer Status: What Does it Mean for Workers and Job Creators?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. of Health, Emp., Lab., & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 113th
Cong. (2014) (statement of Rep. Mark Pocan), available at http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/
sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/9.9.14-PocanOpening-JointEmployerHearing.pdf (“As we turn
the corner on 17-plus NLRB hearings and mark-ups, it seems that we should move our discussion to
something more productive and recognize the realities facing today’s workforce.”).
107 Rushing Union Elections: Protecting the Interests of Big Labor at the Expense of Workers’ Free
Choice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 112th Cong. (2011).
108 Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act, H.R. 4320, 113th Cong. (2014); see Culture of Union
Favoritism: The Return of the NLRB’s Ambush Election Rule: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the
Workforce, 113th Cong. (2014).
109 H.R. 4320.
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In 2015, the Senate, utilizing the Congressional Review Act passed by the
Congress during the Clinton Administration,110 voted to disapprove the
Board’s election rule, which was designed to expedite elections by allowing
the eligibility of employee voters to be resolved after the vote had been
conducted and the ballots counted if the number of employees in dispute would
affect the outcome of the election.111 The House soon followed suite.112 This
statute has brought the Congress into direct and unprecedented conflict with
the rulemaking authority of the Board and its policies.
Additionally, two lines of case law emanating from the Board have
attracted the attention of the House in particular. The first is the Board’s 2011
decision holding that the employees constituting a smaller group than the
facility in total can be appropriate.113 The second area of interest stems from
the NLRB Chicago Regional Director’s decision in Northwestern, holding that
college student athletes are employees within the meaning of the Act.114 Now
Chairman Kline argued that the Northwestern decision “takes a fundamentally
different approach that could make it harder for some students to access a
quality education” and that he “strongly urge[s] the Obama board to change
course and encourage key stakeholders to get to work.”115

110

Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162 (2009). See generally
MORON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING:
AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE (2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30116_20080508.pdf (assessing the nuances, effectiveness, and impact of the
Congressional Review Act). As Professor Balla has said,
The act provides Congress with 60 days during which expedited procedures are available for
disapproval of newly promulgated regulations. A resolution of disapproval introduced during this
period receives numerous advantages, including a lower threshold for discharging the committee
of jurisdiction, a prohibition on the offering of amendments, and a limit on floor debate. A
regulation is prevented from taking effect when a resolution is passed by both chambers and
signed by the president, or when Congress overrides a presidential veto of a resolution.
Steven J. Balla, Legislative Organization and Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 16 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 424, 426–27 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
111 S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (vetoed Mar. 31, 2015). For the Senate debate regarding this resolution, see
161 CONG. REC. S1229–35 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2015); 161 CONG. REC. S1264–66 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2015).
112 The House debate regarding the same resolution is contained at 161 CONG. REC. H1782–88 (daily ed.
Mar 19, 2015).
113 See Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2011 WL 3916077 (2011).
114 Decision and Direction of Election, Northwestern Univ., Case No. 13-RC-121359 (NLRB Region 13,
Mar. 26, 2014). For a discussion of this case, and issues related to it, see William B. Gould IV, Glenn M.
Wong & Eric Weitz, Full Court Press: Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 1 (2014).
115 Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing Student Athletes:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Rep. John Kline,
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Probably no area attracted more congressional attention than the Boeing
matter, where the company was unsuccessful in negotiations to obtain what it
deemed to be adequate safeguards at its Seattle, Washington facilities and thus
made a plan to produce the Dreamliner in South Carolina. The General
Counsel issued a complaint against Boeing in 2011,116 and during the 2012
Presidential campaign, Governor Mitt Romney attacked the Board.117 Even
before this, Senator Lindsey Graham led the charge in attacking the Board, or
more precisely in this case, the General Counsel, about the decision to charge
Boeing.118 A major dispute also broke out between Representative Darrell Issa
as to whether the General Counsel would testify at hearings in South Carolina
on the eve of an unfair labor practice hearing about the Boeing case.119 Other
Republicans in the Senate levied criticism about the charge against Boeing,120
while Democrats expressed support for both the legal process and the General
Counsel’s independence.121
VIII. THE CHANGE IN THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
As noted above, the polarization first identified in the 1980s resulted in the
“batching” of appointments in 1994 during the Clinton administration—the
first since the Taft-Hartley amendments when the Board was expanded. During
the Carter administration, before this trend had begun to set a pattern, the
so-called Republican nominee, Don Zimmerman, previously of Senator
Javits’s staff, was apparently not even a registered Republican, though he filled
a Republican seat. During the Clinton administration, Senator Kassebaum
Chairman of H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=379217.
116 Complaint and Notice of Hearing, Boeing Co., Case No. 19-CA-32431 (NLRB Region 19, Apr. 20,
2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3310/cpt_19-ca032431_boeing__4-20-2011_complaint_and_not_hrg.pdf.
117 Jon Greenberg, Mitt Romney Attack [sic] Barack Obama over Boeing Plan Question, POLITIFACT.COM
(Oct. 14, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/oct/14/mitt-romney/mittromney-attack-barack-obama-over-boeing-plant-/.
118 Kevin Bogardus, Senator Threatened Labor Board Before Boeing Complaint, HILL (Nov. 9, 2011,
10:17 PM EST), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/192737-sen-graham-threatened-labor-board-beforeboeing-complaint-was-filed.
119 E.g., Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Rep. Darrell Issa (June 3, 2011),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/june3.pdf.
120 Letter from Sens. Michael B. Enzi et al., to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB (May 3,
2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/may_3_2011_
letter_from_senator_michael_b._enzi_and_others.pdf.
121 Letter from Sens. Tom Harkin et al. to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB (May 19, 2011),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/may_19_2011_letter_
from_senator_tom_harkin_and_others.pdf.
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insisted that no appointment be made for the so-called Republican seat unless
assurances were received that the nominee would dissent from my opinions,
should they represent a majority on the Board. Those who could not give such
assurances could not make the cut. Senator Lott named the Republican
nominees in 1997 and expressed great interest in those coming from
Democratic side, so great was Republican congressional influence.
Professor Calvin Mackenzie, in a significant work, noted that this produced
an administrative process that was “little more than the sum of a set of
disjointed political calculations,”122 given the fact that the Senate “often delays
confirmation until several nominations to the same agency accumulate, thus
allowing it to require that the president include some nominees who are
effectively designated by powerful senators.”123 Professor Mackenzie
continued, as follows:
The business of the people would be managed by leaders drawn
from the people. Cincinnatus, in-and-outers, noncareer managers—
with every election would come a new sweep of the country for high
energy and new ideas and fresh visions. The president’s team would
assume its place and impose the people’s wishes on the great
agencies of government. Not infrequently, it actually worked that
way.
But these days, the model fails on nearly all counts. Most
appointees do not come from the countryside, brimming with new
energy and ideas. Much more often they come from congressional
staffs or think tanks or interest groups—not from across the country
but from across the street: interchangeable public elites, engaged in
an insider’s’ game.124

***
During George W. Bush’s presidency, the batching process witnessed in
both 1994 and 1997 solidified and was disrupted only when the above-noted
September Massacre convinced Democratic leadership that further cooperation
with President Bush and the appointments process was futile. This created the
first of two major constitutional crises affecting the Board with a Supreme
Court holding that less than three members could not constitute a quorum and

122

G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER: THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS

(1998).
123
124

Id.
Id. at 39–40.

IN

1997, at 31
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thus invalidated the decisions that followed.125 Prior to the September
Massacre, presidents had dealt with the problem of absence of three members
through recess appointments. For instance, in 1997, I was the only one of three
Board members confirmed by the Senate, while the other two served as recess
appointees, and, had the recess appointment process not been employed, the
Board would not have possessed what the Supreme Court ultimately found to
be the requisite quorum.126
Again, President Bush, in contrast to both Presidents Clinton and Obama,
refused to make recess appointments when confronted with an obstinate
Senate. It is never as important to Republican administrations to keep the
NLRB operating as it is under Democratic administrations, given that such a
substantial portion of the Republican Party today opposes the statute
authorizing its creation (though such concerns subsided during the Bush era)
and has only been constrained by the sure veto by Presidents Clinton and
Obama of legislation providing for repeal of the law. The Congressional
Review Act, now used for the first time regarding the rulemaking authority of
the National Labor Relations Board, has circumvented this requirement by
providing a kind of surrogate for repeal. It, too, has run up against an
Obama-veto roadblock.127
During the Obama administration, faced with opposition to his nominees,
President Obama began to make recess appointments, and this led to the most
serious constitutional challenge in NLRB v. Noel Canning.128 The problem of
recess appointments had grown considerably in this period, given a greater
willingness of congressional Republicans to utilize the filibuster over these
appointments.129 Ironically, however, in 2013, the Senate eliminated the
filibuster for all appointments except those to the United States Supreme
Court.130 This development promoted by then-Senate Majority Leader, Harry
Reid of Nevada, constitutes a significant reform that both limits the practical

125

New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010).
See id.
127 Memorandum of Disapproval, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 216 (Mar. 31, 2015); see also Peter
Baker, Obama Rebuffs Congress on New Union Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2015, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/obama-rejects-republican-effort-to-tighten-union-rules.html.
128 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
129 That does not mean that the filibuster was unknown prior to the Obama administration—just that it
was rarely used. Senator Edward Kennedy wrote to me after I was confirmed on March 2, 1994: “It’s a good
thing the Republicans decided not to filibuster!” GOULD, supra note 22, at 49 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
130 Peters, supra note 6.
126
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significance of Noel Canning, as well as diminishes the previous Senate
dominance of both the Clinton and Obama eras. This, in turn, appears to have
at least partially shifted Republican focus away from NLRB appointments and
the pernicious “batching” of nominations toward the law’s interpretation and
administration.
CONCLUSION
Under assault from the beginning of the Act itself, the Board has never
lived in an environment free from the political process. James Landis
recognized that regulatory policies are more permanent, consistent, and
professional when they are not “too closely identified with particular
presidential administrations.”131 Contrarily, former SEC Chairman William
Cary of Columbia Law School points out that although a basis purpose of
independence
is to free commissions from the insidious influences of
politics. . . . there are effects which are extremely serious. Cut loose
from presidential leadership and protection, the agencies must
formulate policy in a political vacuum. Into this vacuum may move
the regulated interests themselves, and by infiltration overcome the
weak regulatory defense to become the strongest influences upon the
regulators.132

In a sense, the idea of staggered terms and the informal consensus that seems
to have emerged around a 3–2 split between the party that controls the White
House and the party in opposition reflects that reality. But political parties,
beginning in the 1980s, have become increasingly polarized, and a
disproportionate amount of the consequent acrimony affects labor–
management relations and regulation of the labor market. Though the very
divisions that produced this make it difficult to establish a labor court that
allows for life tenure of the kind enjoyed by the federal judiciary, nonetheless,
something better than the “batching” process is in order.133

131 GOULD, supra note 22, at 123 (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 140 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
132 GOULD, supra note 56, at 123 (alterations in original) (citing William Cary, The Federal Regulatory
Commissions, Lecture at Princeton University (Apr. 4, 1952)); see also WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967).
133 I advocated a prohibition against reappointment, a modest first step toward depoliticizing the Board
and other quasi-judicial administrative agencies. GOULD, supra note 22, at 125–26.
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The status quo since the 1980s (and ratified in the 1990s) has led, as
Professor Mackenize has written, to the appointment of Washington insiders
disproportionately from congressional staffs rather than from disparate, diverse
portions of the country with backgrounds reflecting such. Beginning with
1994, this produced the “batching” of nominees, which, over at least the most
recent twenty-year period, frequently means the lowest common denominator.
Yet, it must be noted that the present Obama Board represents something of a
departure from the past three decades with four of its five members hailing
from outside the Washington “beltway.” The appointment process should
reflect an attempt to obtain the very best people, who wish to serve for the best
possible reasons. Notwithstanding the appointment of some very capable
people, this has not been the case generally in recent years.
The amount and extent of political interference has increased substantially
since the 1990s and promises to do so again given the composition of Congress
in 2015 and beyond. Congress, now encouraged and prompted by the
Congressional Review Act, seems now to be almost obsessed with the view
that it is the expert, not the Board,134 and that its role is to instruct the Board
about what to do. This tendency may well be more pronounced as the
filibuster’s demise diminishes Senate power over nominees. (At the same time,
it is noteworthy that since 2010, Republicans in both houses have failed to use
congressional “riders” as a rulemaking checkmate, and the failure to do so in
its dealings with the Board is puzzling given any president’s general
unwillingness to veto an appropriations bill over a single item, rider or not.)135
Absent legislative reform or modification (always the prerogative of
Congress and the president), this view is as fundamentally flawed and
inconsistent with the both the rule of law and the idea of independent
regulatory agencies, as would be the case if instructions were given from the
White House to the Board. The rule of law dictates that only the Supreme
Court is the ultimate arbiter.136
One way to insulate appointees from the political process is to both provide
appointments over a more substantial period of time—such as seven or eight
134 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242–43 (1959) (noting that the Board
provides “‘centralized administration of specially designed procedures . . . to obtain uniform application of
substantive rules’” on the basis of its “specialized knowledge and cumulative experience” (quoting Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953)).
135 This was well demonstrated when the “rider” weapon was used against Clinton Board rulemaking. See
GOULD, supra note 22, at 172–73. Is Republican opposition today therefore more theater than substance?
136 See Schmidt, 58 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1944).

GOULD GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

6/4/2015 3:24 PM

POLITICS AND THE EFFECT

1527

years—and to simultaneously preclude reappointments. In the 1990s, I thought
the decrease in case production and reluctance to face some of the hard issues
was directly attributable to fear of political retribution. With the second term
out of the way, conduct based upon that kind of exposure became more akin to
a judicial process itself.
But these kinds of measures are palliatives rather than remedies. In
conservative eras, there is less tension, given the unimportance of labor policy
to such administrations. When the pendulum swings the other way, conflict
and tension are inevitable. The Board, or any other mechanism designed to
take its place, will reflect the divide. Perhaps, even if arguably the sun is now
setting on Senate regulation of the appointment process such as that engaged in
by Senator Trent Lott in the 1990s—and all the undesirable horse-trading and
“batching” which go with it—it is and will be the work of the Board itself that
will be the object of intensified legislative combat in the near future.

